Although the bases were shut down in 1992, the U.S. maintains its dominance through JUSMAG and the Philippines-U.S. Mutual Defense Board (established in 1958), which operates as a “new bilateral defense consultative mechanism” to oversee military cooperation between the two countries. These two mechanisms were reinforced by the Security Engagement Board (SEB) in 2006 designed to deal with nontraditional security threats such as terrorism, piracy, natural disasters (for example, the recent ferry sinking and typhoon), bird flu, and the like not falling under the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty that calls for battling external security threats in either countries. This was supplemented by the Mutual Logistics and Support Agreement (MLSA) signed in November 2002.

Very few know the details of this notorious MLSA. Its salient provision is its mandating the Philippine government to supply all the logistical support and supplies needed by the Pentagon during its exercises and redeployment. Pretty much a bargain compared to the costly Clark and Subic bases of the good old days. Of course, the humanitarian services performed by the troops are only a pretext for the U.S. to interfere in local civil wars in the region, labeling them “international terrorism.” This agreement with the client regime thus insures a virtually un-evictable presence of the U.S. military as police watchdog to promote and secure US economic and geopolitical interests – from profits in oil, energy, and mineral resources to safeguarding the Malacca Straits where 25 percent of all globally traded oil passes.

Immediately after 9/11, the U.S. Department of State promptly labeled the NPA as a terrorist organization so that Arroyo can call on U.S. troops to help her counterinsurgency campaign, even though the Philippine Constitution (Art. II, Sec. 3) prohibits foreign troops’ involvement in internal security matters. Aside from infringing on Philippine sovereignty, the SEB allows the US (to quote IBON, 26 May 2006) “to maintain a prolonged military presence in the country which suits the U.S. military’s current strategy of seeking temporary access to facilities in foreign countries that enable U.S. forces to conduct training and exercises” rather than spending for permanent physical bases. Moreover, the Philippines functions as an important link in the security chain of the U.S. in the Western Pacific. The SEB enhances the U.S.’s limited infrastructure for refueling and logistics needed in its operations in the Arabian Gulf and Western Pacific areas. Mindanao and Sulu islands have been considered strategic locations for monitoring developments in Muslim countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, etc. where there is a rising trend of “Islamic revivalism,” of which the MILF is an instance.

There are also numerous clandestine partnerships allowed by executive “understandings” and philanthropic channels. But it is primarily the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) that legitimizes unrelenting U.S. intervention in the Philippines. Initiated by former president Fidel Ramos under the rubric of “Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement” drawn up by the Pentagon, the VFA was finally approved during the Estrada administration (Daniel B. Schirmer, Fidel Ramos: The Pentagon’s Philippine Friend, 1992-1997, Cambridge, MA, 1997).

Made fully operational after Sept. 11, 2001, the VFA makes up for the loss of Subic and Clark in a much more efficient way. It allows the Pentagon to land anywhere in the country without entailing the cost of maintaining physical structures and insuring environmental safety. It also has no responsibility in whatever damage it can cause by its joint exercises with the host country. While the MLSA (renewed for another 5 years) permits the U.S. to use the Philippines as a launching pad for wars of aggression through the pre-positioning of war material in “virtual bases,” the VFA allows the unhampered entry of U.S. troops for covert operations in the course of “Kapit-Bisig” war games and “Balikatan” joint exercises with its surrogate army, the AFP. Sara Flounders’ sharp analysis of this new Pentagon concept of “Cooperative Security Locations” – 5,458 discrete military installations around the world – highlights its key features: facilities with rotational U.S. presence, containing prepositioned equipment, rapidly scalable and expandable, offering bilateral and regional training. One virtue is the overwhelming influence gained by the U.S. on smaller and developing nations, verified by former U.S. Pacific commander Admiral Thomas Fargo who explained in March 2003 that “relationships built through exercises and training are ‘our biggest guarantor of access in time of need'” (Sara Flounders, “Expansion of U.S. Bases Spurs Philippine Resistance,” International Action Center, 29 March 2008).

The virtually permanent presence of U.S. troops in the Philippines can be accounted for by the VFA, MSLA, and other instrumentalities enforced by a subservient government parasitic on U.S. military aid and political sponsorship. The Arroyo regime easily fits the bill. Because other countries in the region (Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia; Myanmar has rebuffed U.S. humanitarian offers) cannot tolerate U.S. ships or troops stationed in its territory, the U.S. has no alternative but to support authoritarian rulers like Marcos and Arroyo if it wants to curb Al-Qaeda influence, check China’s expansion, and project its military might in the Asia-Pacific geopolitical sphere. Surely, the splintered tiny Abu Sayyaf always used to rationalize U.S. troops in the Philippines is no threat to U.S. global hegemony. U.S. military basing in the Philippines can only be explained by the long-range global strategy of preserving U.S. superpower status by preventing the rise of competitors such as China (Herbert Docena, “In the Dragon’s Lair,” Foreign Policy in Focus, 26 February 2008).

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